








Abstract: The notion of “Islamic finance” was born during the tumultuous 
identity-politics years of the mid-twentieth century. Indian, Pakistani, and Arab 
thinkers contemplated independence from Britain, and independence of Pakistan from 
India, within a context of “Islamic society.” Islam was assumed to inspire political, 
economic, and financial systems that are distinctive and independent of the Western 
(Capitalist) and Eastern (Socialist) models of the epoch. The term “Islamic economics” 
was coined by Abu al-A`la AlMawdudi, whose students and followers worked to 
develop an ostensible Islamic social science (Kuran, 2004). Mawdudi’s influence on 
Arab Islamists began with the writings of Sayid Qutb, the father of modern Arab 
political Islam, whose quasi-exegesis Under the Qur’anic Shade referred exclusively 
to Mawdudi’s writings on economic matters. Mawdudi’s migration from majority-
Hindu Indian society to maority-Muslim Pakistan thus became a prototype for Islamist 
migration away from secular political and economic systems. 
Keywords: Islamic Finance, Islamic Banking, Islamic Economics, Financing, 
Sukuk, Islamic Mutual Funds. 
 
From Islamic Economics to Islamic Banks 
In the first few decades of its existence, Islamic economics focused on 
comparative economic systems (a fashionable field at the time) as well as neo-Classical 
and Keynesian modeling with a highly stylized homoislamicus (a moral and ethical 
individual who shuns excessive greed and consumerism) in place of mainstream 
economics’ homoeconomicus (a selfish utility and profit maximizer); Haneef (1995). 
As a byproduct, Islamic banking emerged in the Islamic economists’ literature as a 
financial system based exclusively on profit-and-loss sharing, which was argued to be 
more equitable and stable; Chapra (1996), Siddiqi (1983). In the process, Islamic 
economists focused on the Islamic prohibition of riba or usury, which they interpreted 
as a prohibition of all interest-based lending, in accordance with earlier interpretations 
of the Judeo-Christian canon. 
Classical Islamic jurisprudence had interpreted interest-based lending, the 
cornerstone of fractional-reserve depositary banking, as riskless - and therefore 
illegitimate and inequitable - return for idle capitalists. Indeed, the importance of credit 
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and counterparty risk for any financial analysis remains conspicuously absent from the 
writings of the Islamic-economics faithful. The preferred financial model, they 
postulated, would be based on the ancient silent-partnership model known in Islamic 
writings as mudaraba, corresponding to the Jewish heter iska and the Christian-
European commenda; Udovich (1970). 
An “Islamic bank” was envisioned as a two-tier silent partnership. Thus, deposits 
seeking a return (as opposed to fiduciary deposits, for which 100% reserves are 
required) would not be guaranteed loans to the bank, but rather silent-partnership 
investments in the bank’s portfolio. In turn, the bank’s investments of those funds 
would not consist of loans and acquisition of debt instruments, but rather profit-and-
loss sharing investments in other silent partnerships. Thus, the Islamic bank would 
serve its financial intermediation function (pooling of return-seeking savings and 
diversification of investments) through profit-andloss sharing. This idea continues to 
serve as the cornerstone of Islamic banking today, despite being thoroughly debunked 
by prominent jurists; Tantawi (2001), El-Gamal (2003). 
Potential loss of return-seeking deposits was assumed by Islamic-banking 
proponents such as the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) to encourage 
depositormonitoring and risk-mitigating market-based discipline. Thus, the grossly 
inadequate depositor-protection measures supported by the industry have focused on 
transparency of operations and profit-distribution mechanisms; IFSB (2006). 
The Practice of Islamic Banking 
This risk-sharing model has continued to shape the liabilities-side of Islamic 
banks’ balance sheets, with few exceptions in Europe and the United States, where 
regulators have required Islamic financial providers that function as banks to guarantee 
deposits. The assetsside of Islamic banks and financial providers, on the other hand, 
has utilized multiple structured-financial models to replicate loans and fixed-return 
securities that limit the banks’ exposure to credit risk. The transformation from the 
idealistic profit-and-loss sharing model of Islamic economics - which continues to be 
hailed as the “Islamic ideal” by industry practitioners and commentators - to replication 
of modern financial products and markets in “Islamic” garb coincided with the 
increased importance of classical methods of Islamic jurisprudence and a limited 
rhetorical role for Islamic economics. 
Early models in the subcontinent during the 1950s and in Egypt during the 1960s 
notwithstanding, the true beginnings of Islamic banking and finance occurred in the 
mid 1970s. Islamic jurists including the Shiite scholar Baqir al-Sadr and many Sunni 
scholars in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere collaborated with Islamist bankers to 
replicate loans using ancient contract forms. Baqir al-Sadr, in his classical work The 
Non-Usurious Bank in Islam had attempted to use similar structured products to 
replicate guaranteed bank deposit on the liabilities side. However, since risk-sharing 
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depositors were clearly beneficial to the shareholders of Islamic banks, and because 
the latter drove innovation in Islamic banking through the retention of lawyers and 
religious scholars, most of the “innovations” were restricted to the assets-side of the 
balance sheet. 
Murabaha (Cost-Plus Sale) Financing 
The workhorse of Islamic banking has been the murabaha (cost-plus sale) 
contract. The logical evolution of this form of finance is indicative of the general 
methodology of Islamic finance to this day. In the early 1980s, Islamic banks in the 
Gulf were flush with petrodollars, and Western corporations were eager to borrow from 
them as Western-bank credit dried up following the petrodollar-driven Latin American 
debt crisis. Islamic banks resorted to the easiest ancient trick: introducing a property to 
separate lent principal from repaid principal plus interest. 
In the simplest ruse, the bank could have sold some commodity to its potential 
borrower on credit (for principal + interest payable later), and then bought it back for 
cash (principal paid immediately), thus effectively replicating the cashflows of the 
loan, with the commodity making a roundtrip from bank to customer and back. 
However, this ancient ruse was forbidden by name as same-item sale resale (bay` al-
`ina). In practice, one credit sale and one spot sale of liquid commodities were still used 
to accomplish the desired goal by conducting the second spot sale with a third party. 
Interestingly, Al-Rajhi Investment Company in Saudi Arabia, which has one of 
the strictest religious-scholar boards, received a question on the legitimacy of credit 
sale of gold, and ruled that such sales were disallowed because gold is a monetary 
commodity. Promptly thereafter, the same board was asked if platinum can be sold on 
credit, and issued a fatwa that this was permitted. Thus, Islamic banks could simply 
trade precious metals, acquiring an amount of platinum (or other metal excluding gold 
and silver) equal in value to the desired loan principal. The metal was then sold on 
credit to the Western borrower under a murabaha contract, with a credit price equal to 
the desired principal plus interest. The customer was then able to sell the metal quickly 
to receive the desired borrowed principal, perhaps less a small transaction cost. 
This was the juristic solution first popularized by the late banker Sami Humud in 
his book Evolving Banking Transactions in Accordance with Islamic Law (1976). The 
prohibition of riba (usury) in the Islamic canon and subsequent juristic analysis left 
room for such ruses. The Qur’an merely mentioned riba in the abstract without 
specifying precisely which transactions were thus forbidden. The Prophetic tradition 
merely listed six commodities: gold, silver, dates, wheat, barley, and salt, all of which 
were used at some point as commodity monies in the ancient world, stipulating that 
those may be traded only hand-to-hand and in equal amounts measured by weight or 
volume. One school of jurisprudence (Hanafi) expanded the prohibition to all 
commodities measured by weight or volume, but still did not treat them as money. 
"Science and Education" Scientific Journal / ISSN 2181-0842 October 2021 / Volume 2 Issue 10
www.openscience.uz 654
Therefore, while trading platinum now for platinum later, or trading gold now for silver 
later, would both be deemed impermissible based on the Hanafi interpretation, trading 
platinum now for Dollars later was considered permissible. 
Interestingly, the Halacha, developed by Jewish scholars prior and in parallel to 
the development of Islamic Fiqh, forbade such embedded-interest credit sales 
(Reisman, 1995, p.112). In contrast, all major schools of Islamic jurisprudence (four 
Sunni and four Shiite) have allowed credit sales at prices possibly exceeding the spot 
price. Initially, this was only a method for seller financing. Thus, the financier needed 
first to acquire the property before selling it on credit. In addition, to give the contract 
an Islamic flavor, the industry adopted the name of an ancient cost-plus sale - 
murabaha, a contract devised to protect buyers who were unfamiliar with market prices, 
allowing them to negotiate prices by negotiating markup over revealed cost. 
The contract that emerged in the 1970s was formally known as “cost-plus sale to 
the customer who ordered the initial purchase” (murabaha lil-‘amir bil-shira’ ). It was 
initially subject to scholarly controversy, especially as bankers added provisions to 
eliminate all forms of risk other than customer-credit. In order to eliminate property-
related risks, which were ironically the basis on which jurists allowed earning a return 
on the transaction, they allowed banks to stipulate that the eventual buyer must 
guarantee buying the property on credit once the bank acquires it. Eventually, wide 
consensus emerged and the contract became the workhorse of Islamic banking 
practices from large multi-million-Dollar loans to Western corporations to retail-bank 
secured lending. 
Tawarruq (Monetization) Financing 
In order to reduce transaction costs, especially for retail customers who wished to 
borrow cash, Islamic banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries revived 
another ancient financial trick: monetization. This transaction is very similar to the 
cost-plus commodity-sale finance model, with the added complication that the Islamic 
bank executes all three legs of the transaction: (i) buying the principal’s worth of metals 
at the spot price, (ii) selling said metals to the customer on credit for principal plus 
interest, and (iii) selling the metals back to the dealer, as the customer’s agent, for the 
spot price less a small fee. All three transactions can be concluded within minutes via 
fax. 
This transaction avoids the forbidden two-party sale-resale trick by adding not 
only one commodity as a degree of separation between lent principal and repaid 
principal plus interest, but also a third-trading-party degree of separation (the metals 
dealer) so that every two parties formally trade the commodity only once. The 
commodity still completes a round-trip (dealerbankcustomerdealer), spot cash in 
the amount of desired principal complete one trip (bankdealercustomer), and the 
credit-sale-price payment of principal plus interest occurs in the future 
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(customerbank). This three-party variation on same-item sale resale was also known 
in ancient and medieval practice, and deemed forbidden or reprehensible by most 
schools of law. Some medieval scholars within the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, 
which is dominant in the GCC, had permitted this practice. Despite the fact that the 
most respected 14th Century scholars ibn Qayim and ibn Taymiya forbade the 
transaction (as merely an expensive and potentially more hazardous type of usury/riba), 
contemporary Hanbali jurists who dominate one juristic council in Saudi Arabia 
permitted the practice in 1998. The same council later forbade the organized practice 
of Islamic banks using this contract in 2003, but the practice continued to thrive. 
Ijara (lease) Financing, Securitization, and Sukuk (Islamic Bonds) 
Despite juristic approval of credit-sale-based financing methods, the practice 
remained suspect in scholarly as well as general Islamist circles. In addition to 
objections that the practice merely replicated interest-based financing with interest 
characterized as profit or markup, there were problems with securitization and trading 
of receivables from murabaha and tawarruq facilities. Those problems arose from the 
fact that most jurists, with the notable exception of those in Malaysia, forbade trading 
of debts, except under very strict transfers at face values and resale to the debtor. This 
prevented the development of secondary markets that would allow banks to diversify 
their portfolios and sources of funds. Lease financing provided a partial solution to 
both problems: it was ostensibly based on real assets that continued to play a role 
throughout the life of the financial facility, and it was possible to trade lease receivables 
on secondary markets as ostensible shares in the leased assets. 
Jurists were adamant that Islamic lease or ijara financing must be truly asset-
based, and therefore must be structured as operating rather than financial leases. 
However, recent advances in structured finance - which helped corporations such as 
Enron to move debts and interest payments off balance sheets through sale-lease-back 
structures - had blurred the line between operating and financial leases. As a result, a 
prestigious juristic council declared in 2008 that more than 80% of lease-based bond 
(sukuk) structures were un-Islamic, since material ownership of the underlying assets 
was not real. 
Developed initially as another mode of secured lending, lease financing proceeded 
by acquiring durable assets and leasing them with an option to buy - principal plus 
interest passing to the lessor as rent plus potential final payment. For banks in countries 
that forbid them from owning real estate, special purpose vehicles (SPVs) received 
credit that were used to acquire the assets and lease them till maturity. Shares in those 
SPVs were treated as shares in the leased properties, thus allowing them to trade on 
secondary markets. In the United States, such structures were used to originate 
mortgage loans that were then securitized through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and 
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marketed both domestically and in the cash-rich GCC, especially after the second wave 
of petrodollar flows began in 2001. 
Bond structures were easily adapted from those financial forms. An entity that 
wished to issue a bond would create an SPV, which sold shares for the amount of 
financing desired. The proceeds of that sale were used to buy some asset from the 
originator, which asset was promptly leased back. The originator would thus collect 
the proceeds of the sale of its asset as principal, and pay principal plus interest in the 
form of rent and/or a final repurchase price, which payments were passed through to 
the sukuk or bond holders. An added advantage of this structure is that the payments 
were made ostensibly on shares in ownership of the real asset, thus the contract could 
be advertised as a form of partnership, which appealed to the earlier political-Islam 
inspired literature on Islamic economics. 
Jurists further facilitated securitization of debts by allowing a portfolio of asset-
based and purely debt-based receivables (e.g. lease-based and credit-sale-based, 
respectively) to be traded as long as the asset-based component exceeded 51% of the 
total face value; Usmani (1998). This strange provision clearly imposed no significant 
constraints on securitization, since successive portions of pure-debt receivables could 
be bundled iteratively with the same asset-based ones, which may be repeatedly bought 
back for the purpose of bundling with pure-debt tranches. Thus, Islamic finance 
became an equal partner in the credit bubble the ensued in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. In fact, the volume of sukuk remained sufficiently small (relative 
to demand by Islamic banks) to merit abnormally high prices and low yields relative to 
conventional debts issued by the same entities.  
Islamic Mutual Funds 
A widely publicized area of Islamic finance was the development of “screening” 
methods to identify “Shari`a compliant” stocks. Those screens excluded stocks of 
companies with significant forbidden activities (e.g. breweries), but also of firms with 
excessive debt or interest income. The debt screen chosen by the industry was 
particularly perplexing, as it excluded firms with debt to market capitalization ratios 
exceeding one-third. This rule clearly forced fund managers to buy-high and sell-low 
in highly volatile makets. Moreover, the rule diverted funds away from Muslim-owned 
companies, which were not allowed any degree of unsecured-loan leverage, in favor of 
western firms with moderate levels of leverage. The financial screens themselves had 
no foundation in Islamic law or reasonable economic analysis, starting as they did at 
5% debt to assets and evolving during the tech-stock bubble of the late 1990s into 33% 
of debt to assets and then 33% debt to market capitalization. It is not clear whether and 
when these rules can be replaced with sensible ones. 
Takaful (Islamic Insurance) and Derivatives 
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One of the fast growing sectors in Islamic finance is an Islamic alternative to 
commercial insurance known as takaful (mutual support). The rhetoric of this sector is 
based on the idea of mutual protection against losses, but most takaful companies to-
date have not been structured as mutual insurance companies (wherein policyholders 
would be the same as shareholders). Instead, takaful companies are generally 
shareholder owned and act through silent partnership or agency to invest the 
policyholders’ premiums and pay legitimate claims in the form of “voluntary 
contributions” - thus avoiding the Islamic prohibition of gharar, which includes trading 
known amounts (policy premia) for uncertain future amounts (on potential valid 
insurance claims). The prohibition of gharar was also invoked to forbid derivative 
securities, but forwards and options were easily synthesized from the ancient contracts 
of salam (prepaid forward sale) and `urbun (downpayment call option), respectively. 
Conclusion 
El-Gamal (2008) has argued that the essence of the ancient religious law was 
regulatory. It is well known in financial economics that financial innovators eventually 
find means to circumvent outdated regulation, thus increasing systemic risk. Financial 
crises later propel political and economic authorities to impose further regulations for 
innovators to circumvent. In this regard, the ancient religious regulations enshrined in 
Medieval Islamic jurisprudence, especially if interpreted naively as prohibitions of 
certain contracts and permissions of others, is woefully out of date, and therefore have 
ceased to perform their regulatory function centuries ago. Indeed, that is precisely why 
majority-Muslim societies had abandoned those outdated contract-based frameworks 
before the Islamist revisionism of the mid twentieth century. The ancient law, which is 
not uniquely Islamic, does contain many lessons for today’s societies - Muslim and 
otherwise. However, rent-seeking behavior by bankers, lawyers, and religious scholars 
on the one hand, and incoherent pietism and adherence to fictional Utopian history on 
the other, have prevented societies from adapting this centuries-old accumulated 
human wisdom for any purpose beyond short-term self enrichment and identity-
political appeasement, both of which increase rather than ameliorate systemic risks. 
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